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The Supreme Court is currently reconsidering the question when, if ever, the Free
Exercise Clause requires exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability. This Essay
proposes an answer that is based on the idea—which this Essay labels the “Principle of
Consistency”—that the First Amendment requires comparable levels of protection for
speech and religious exercise. Other scholars applying the Principle of Consistency have
discussed the implications of United States v. O’Brien, which prescribed intermediate
scrutiny for incidental burdens on speech, for the problem of exemptions under the Free
Exercise Clause. But no one has discussed the implications of two lines of cases in
which the Court has applied strict scrutiny to incidental burdens on speech—NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and its progeny, and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees and its
progeny—for the problem of exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause. This Essay
argues that, together with O’Brien, these lines of cases support a regime in which
incidental burdens on religious exercise trigger intermediate scrutiny, unless they take
the form of (1) government allocations of doctrinal authority or spiritual responsibilities
in religious institutions (the “ministerial exception”) or (2) pressures on a person to
violate her religious conscience (the “conscience exception”), in which case they trigger
strict scrutiny.
INTRODUCTION
The question when, if ever, the Free Exercise Clause requires
exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability has proven one of the most
difficult problems in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court
endorsed one answer to the question in Sherbert v. Verner, holding that
incidental burdens on religious exercise generally trigger strict scrutiny. 1 But
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1 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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this answer never really stuck.2 After years of wrangling, the Court abandoned
Sherbert and tried a different answer in Employment Division v. Smith, holding
that incidental burdens on religious exercise trigger at most rational-basis
scrutiny.3 But this answer would not stick, either.4 The Court has already
qualified Smith when adjudicating religious institutions’ right to select their
own ministers.5 This term, it heard a case in which the petitioners asked it to
overrule Smith altogether.6
The justices of the Supreme Court are not the only ones who have been
unable to agree about exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause. After
Smith, Congress intervened in favor of exemptions to federal laws, 7 but not all
state legislatures followed suit.8 Scholars, meanwhile, have weighed in with
radically diverse proposals, ranging from the view that religious exemptions
are almost never permitted by the Establishment Clause, let alone required by
the Free Exercise Clause,9 to the view that religious exemptions are almost

2 Justice Rehnquist, for example, persistently dissented from decisions applying
Sherbert. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 722 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Sherbert . . . reads the Free Exercise Clause more broadly than
is warranted.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“I adhere to the views I stated in dissent in Thomas . . . .”).
3 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990).
4 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Smith remains controversial . . . .”); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I continue to believe that Smith adopted
an improper standard for deciding free exercise claims.”); id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“I have serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith rule and its entitlement
to adherence.”); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I have doubts
about whether the Smith rule merits adherence.”); id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“I continue to believe that Smith was wrongly decided . . . .”).
5 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 565 U.S. 171,
189–90 (2012).
6 See Questions Presented, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No.
19-123).
7 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The
Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states in Boerne, 521 U.S. at
529–36.
8 For a list of which states have enacted RFRA-like legislation and which have not, see
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
9 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 473, 493 (1996) (“[T]he Court in Smith . . . should have gone so far as to prohibit
the legislature from granting special privileges to religious objectors alone absent a
compelling governmental interest.”).
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always required by the Free Exercise Clause, 10 with a great host of views in
between.11
A rare point of widespread (even if not universal) agreement in the
debate is that the First Amendment prescribes comparable levels of
protection for speech and religious exercise; hence, courts should be
consistent in how they treat incidental burdens on speech and incidental
burdens on religious exercise.12 Call this the “Principle of Consistency.” Of
course, there is disagreement about what the Principle of Consistency implies
regarding how courts should treat incidental burdens on religious exercise. 13
But on the Principle of Consistency itself, there is relative (even if not
absolute) consensus. As the Court stated in Prince v. Massachusetts, it is

10 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Some Difficulties in Assuring Equality and Avoiding
Endorsement, 54 VILL. L. REV. 613, 613 (2009) (defending a “Free Exercise Clause
requirement . . . of exemptions from generally applicable regulations unless there is a
compelling state interest”).
11 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Nelson, Note, A Textual Approach to Harmonizing Sherbert and
Smith on Free Exercise Accommodations, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 801, 828–43 (2008)
(proposing a “first-in-time” rule that requires an exemption if and only if the burdened
religious practice predated the burdening law).
12 See, e.g., David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 SW. U. L.
REV. 201, 248 (1997) (“[T]he Court should have a similar standard for generally applicable
laws under both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment . . . .”);
Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First
Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 58 (2001)
(“[I]n both religion cases and expression cases, the Court should apply the same standard
of review whenever an individual claims an exemption from a neutral, generally applicable
law.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75
IND. L.J. 77, 121 (2000) (characterizing the Court’s differential treatment of “incidental
burdens on religious practices” and “incidental burdens on expression” as “perverse”);
Daniel J. Hay, Note, Baptizing O’Brien: Towards Intermediate Protection of Religiously Motivated
Expressive Conduct, 68 VAND. L. REV. 177, 180 (2015) (characterizing the “tests the Court has
applied to challenges to generally applicable laws that indirectly burden First Amendment
rights” as “needlessly divergent”); Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free
Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 154 (1987) (encouraging the Court to “put[] free
exercise and free speech cases on the same plane”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1486–88 (1990)
(arguing that the original meanings of “abridging” in the Free Speech Clause and
“prohibiting” in the Free Exercise Clause are synonymous); Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent
Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1344
(1995) (arguing that the Court should generalize its approach to incidental burdens “in
the free speech context” to the entire First Amendment).
13 Compare, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990) (defending the
majority’s rule on the ground that it brings the Court’s free-speech and free-exercise
doctrines into alignment), with id. at 901–02 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(attacking the majority’s rule on the ground that it knocks the Court’s free-speech and freeexercise doctrines out of alignment).
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“doubt[ful] that any of the great liberties insured by the [First Amendment]
can be given higher place than the others.” 14
This Essay argues that the Principle of Consistency is the key to an
attractive but so-far overlooked solution to the problem of exemptions under
the Free Exercise Clause. According to this solution, incidental burdens on
religious exercise should trigger intermediate scrutiny, with two exceptions:
(1) government allocations of doctrinal authority or spiritual responsibilities
in religious institutions (the “ministerial exception”) and (2) government
pressures to violate religious conscience (the “conscience exception”) should
each trigger strict scrutiny. Part I argues that the Principle of Consistency
supports subjecting most incidental burdens on religious exercise to
intermediate scrutiny. Part II argues that the Principle of Consistency
supports subjecting incidental burdens on religious exercise that fall within
the ministerial and conscience exceptions to strict scrutiny.
I.

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR MOST INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON RELIGIOUS
EXERCISE

The Court articulated the test that it ordinarily applies to incidental
burdens on speech in United States v. O’Brien.15 Under this test, the Free
Speech Clause permits an incidental burden on speech if and only if the law
furthers a “substantial governmental interest” in a way that restricts speech no
more “than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”16 The O’Brien test
is sometimes called “intermediate scrutiny.” 17 It is more stringent than mere
rational-basis scrutiny: it requires a “substantial” interest rather than a merely
legitimate interest, and it requires narrow tailoring. But it is less stringent
than strict scrutiny: it requires only a “substantial” interest rather than a
“compelling” interest, and the Court has held that its narrow-tailoring
requirement, though articulated in way that echoes the narrow-tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny, is in fact more deferential. 18
In conjunction with the Principle of Consistency, O’Brien implies that the
Court should, in general, apply intermediate scrutiny to incidental burdens
on religious exercise. That is, the Court should generally treat incidental
burdens on religious exercise as permissible under the Free Exercise Clause
14 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); see also Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t
of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2266–67, 2267 n.2 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing
Establishment Clause standing doctrine on the grounds that it results in weaker protections
of religious exercise than of speech).
15 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
16 Id. at 377.
17 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 12, at 24. Although the term “intermediate scrutiny”
is sometimes used to characterize other tests as well, this Essay uses it exclusively to refer to
the O’Brien test.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (“[A]n incidental
burden on speech is . . . permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation.”).
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if and only if they are narrowly tailored to further a substantial government
interest.
Some scholars19 have argued that the test that the Court should
transpose onto incidental burdens on religious exercise is the test for timeplace-manner restrictions on speech articulated in Clark v. Community for
Creative Nonviolence.20 Under this test, restrictions on the time, place, or
manner (but not the content) of speech are permitted if and only if “they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” and “leave
open ample alternative channels for communication.” 21
To the extent that the test from Clark differs from the test from O’Brien,22
the Principle of Consistency does not support transposing the test from Clark
onto incidental burdens on religious exercise. An incidental burden is one
that results from the application of a neutral law. A law is nonneutral with
respect to speech (or religion) if and only if it was designed to regulate speech
(or religion) as such.23 But time-place-manner restrictions on speech are laws
that are designed to regulate speech as such: they prohibit speaking during
certain times and/or in certain places and/or in certain ways—for example,
at midnight in a residential neighborhood with a bullhorn. So, time-placemanner restrictions impose direct rather than incidental burdens on
speech.24 True, because they are content neutral, they receive more
deferential treatment than restrictions that are content based. But they are
nonetheless direct burdens on speech; the distinction between direct and
incidental burdens should not be conflated with the distinction between
content-neutral and content-based restrictions. Therefore, although the
Principle of Consistency may support transposing the test from Clark onto a
subcategory of direct burdens on religious exercise that is analogous to the
category of time-place-manner restrictions on speech, it does not support
transposing the test from Clark onto the category of incidental burdens on
religious exercise.
II.

STRICT SCRUTINY FOR THE MINISTERIAL AND CONSCIENCE EXCEPTIONS

Although the Court’s free-speech jurisprudence in conjunction with the
Principle of Consistency implies that most incidental burdens on religious
19 E.g., McCoy, supra note 12, at 1355–73.
20 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
21 Id. at 293.
22 According to the Court, the two tests are “little, if any, different.” Id. at 298.
23 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) (“[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral.”). Although the paradigm example of such a
law is one that on its face restricts speech or religion, a law may be designed to regulate
speech or religion even if it is drafted to conceal this design by being facially neutral. See,
e.g., id. at 534 (explaining that “[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment” remains nonneutral even if “masked” in facially neutral terms).
24 See Hay, supra note 12, at 199 (“[W]hen the government regulates the time, place,
or manner of speech, it is unmistakably targeting speech.”).
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exercise should trigger intermediate scrutiny, it does not imply that all
incidental burdens on religious exercise should trigger intermediate scrutiny.
The Court has subjected incidental burdens on speech to strict scrutiny in two
contexts. Section A reviews the cases in which the Court has subjected
incidental burdens on speech to strict scrutiny and extracts the principle that
most plausibly explains them. Section B transposes that principle onto the
Free Exercise Clause, where it requires strict scrutiny for incidental burdens
on religious exercise that fall within the ministerial and conscience
exceptions.
A. Special Categories of Incidental Burdens on Speech
This Section attempts to uncover the principle behind the two lines of
cases in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny to incidental burdens on
speech. Subsection 1 reviews the two lines of cases. Subsection 2 works
backward to the principle that explains them. This principle, Subsection 3
concludes, is that “neutrally definable” categories of serious threats to the
central purposes of the Free Speech Clause trigger strict scrutiny, where a
category is “neutrally definable” if and only if a court need not draw
conclusions about matters that the First Amendment places beyond its
authority in order to determine what falls within the category. Following the
Court, this Essay assumes that the First Amendment places it beyond the
authority of courts to determine whether a party’s political, moral, or religious
convictions are true.25
1.

Exceptions to the Rule that Incidental Burdens on Speech Trigger
Intermediate Scrutiny

Supreme Court caselaw contains two exceptions to the general rule that
incidental
burdens
on
speech
trigger
intermediate
scrutiny.
Subsubsection (a) discusses the first exception, which comprises cases
involving compelled disclosure of membership in dissident expressive
associations. Subsubsection (b) discusses the second exception, which
comprises cases involving interference with expressive associations’
leadership.

25 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that “the First
Amendment precludes” a jury from evaluating “the truth or verity of [a person’s] religious
doctrines or beliefs”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion . . . .”).
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The Court Reserves Strict Scrutiny for Compelled Disclosure of
Membership in Dissident Expressive Associations

The caselaw on compelled disclosure of membership in expressive
associations begins with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which the
Court held that a state-court order requiring the NAACP to disclose its
membership violated NAACP members’ First Amendment rights.26 The Court
recognized that “Alabama . . . ha[d] taken no direct action . . . to restrict the
right of [NAACP] members to associate freely.” 27 Nonetheless, the Court
insisted, “abridgment of” rights of “speech, press, or association” may “follow
from varied forms of governmental action,” including governmental action
that “appear[s] to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.”28 The Court
observed that the NAACP had made “an uncontroverted showing that on past
occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members ha[d]
exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.” 29 Thus,
compelled membership disclosure would effectively freeze would-be
members’ right to associate for expressive purposes. 30 The Court held that
only a “compelling” state interest could justify such a severe, albeit incidental,
burden on speech.31 Finding Alabama’s interest in the disclosure less than
compelling, the Court concluded that the First Amendment precluded
Alabama from enforcing the order.32
Two years later, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, the Court held that a local
ordinance requiring membership disclosure was unconstitutional as applied
to the NAACP.33 Citing Patterson, the Court emphasized that the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment “are protected not only against heavyhanded frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle
governmental interference.”34 Because compelling the NAACP to disclose its
membership would constitute such a “significant interference with the

26 NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451, 466 (1958).
27 Id. at 461.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 462.
30 Id. at 462–63.
31 Id. at 463. One could argue that the state-court order at issue imposed a direct
burden on speech because compelled disclosure of membership constitutes compelled
speech. But the Court has not generally treated required disclosures to the government as
unconstitutionally compelled speech. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487
U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (proposing, to avoid a compelled-speech problem, that a state “publish
the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to file” instead
of requiring the fundraisers to communicate the information to prospective donors). At
any rate, the Court’s stated reason for subjecting the order to heightened scrutiny was the
effect that enforcing the order would have on would-be NAACP members’ right to associate,
not the fact that the order compelled speech by the NAACP to the government.
32 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464–66.
33 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 517, 527 (1960).
34 Id. at 523.
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freedom of association of [the NAACP’s] members,” the Court required the
government to “show[] a subordinating interest which is compelling” and
“reasonably related” to the enforcement of the ordinance. 35 Determining
that the government had failed to meet this standard, the Court concluded
that the First Amendment entitled the NAACP to an exemption from the
ordinance.36
In Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, it was the Socialist
Workers Party that sought an exemption from a compelled-disclosure law.37
The Court did not retreat from Patterson and Bates or confine them to the
unique circumstances surrounding racial desegregation in the South.
Instead, the Court applied the test that it had articulated in Buckley v. Valeo38
for when a political party is sufficiently “dissident” to qualify for an exemption
from a generally applicable disclosure law. 39 The Court went so far as to
declare that “[t]he First Amendment prohibits a State from compelling
disclosures” from such a party.40 Although compelling the disclosures would
be permissible if there were a “substantial relation between the information
sought” and a “compelling state interest,”41 the “government’s interests in
compelling disclosures are diminished in the case of minor parties.” 42
The line of cases from Patterson to Brown marks an exception to the
general rule that incidental burdens on speech trigger intermediate scrutiny.
According to this line of cases, compelling a dissident expressive association
to disclose its membership triggers strict scrutiny. It is true that the Court did
not use the term “strict scrutiny” in Patterson, and it did not employ the
language of “least restrictive means” that is familiar from modern
formulations of the strict-scrutiny test. But it is important to remember that
35 Id. at 523–25.
36 Id. at 525–27.
37 Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982).
38 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
39 See Brown, 459 U.S. at 88 (explaining that the party must be “minor,” and there
must be “a ‘reasonable probability’ that the compelled disclosures will subject those
identified to ‘threats, harassment, or reprisals’” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74)).
40 Id. at 101.
41 Id. at 92 (citing Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963)).
42 Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Unfortunately, the Court was not entirely clear about whether compelled disclosures like
those at issue in Brown always require a compelling government interest or, as Patterson and
Bates suggest, they require a compelling government interest only as applied to dissident
political parties. For an argument that the Court treated the Socialist Workers Party’s
dissident status as “trigger[ing] a more demanding standard of review” rather than merely
causing the statute as applied to fail the standard of review applicable to all political parties,
see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 62–63 (1987)
[hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral]. Since Brown, the Court has made clear that disclosure
requirements in the electoral context are subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires a
“sufficiently important” government interest rather than a compelling government
interest, and reiterated that “as-applied challenges would be available” to dissident groups.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010).
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the use of “strict scrutiny” as a term of art and the modern formulation of the
test that it stands for had not yet come into judicial parlance in 1958, when
the Court decided Patterson. The Court’s insistence of a tight nexus to a
“compelling” state interest is as close to modern formulations of the strictscrutiny test that one could expect in an opinion from 1958. Indeed, there is
evidence that the concept of strict scrutiny emerged from a body of First
Amendment cases that included, inter alia, Patterson.43 It is no surprise, then,
that scholars writing in retrospect characterize these cases as applying strict
scrutiny.44
b. The Court Reserves Strict Scrutiny for Government Interference in
Expressive Associations’ Leadership
Patterson and its progeny are not the only line of cases in which the Court
has applied strict scrutiny to incidental burdens on speech. In a second line
of cases, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to government interference in
expressive associations’ leadership.
The second line of cases starts with Roberts v. United States Jaycees, which
involved the application of a Minnesota public-accommodations statute that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex to the Jaycees, an expressive
association that admitted only men as voting members.45 The Court held that
the First Amendment permits government “interfere[nce] with the internal
organization or affairs” of such a group if and only if it furthers “compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” 46 The
Court expressed skepticism that “admission of women as full voting members
[would] impede” the Jaycees’ expressive aims. 47 However, it held that any
“incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech” was at any rate “no
greater than is necessary” to further the government’s “compelling interest”
in preventing discrimination against women.48 Therefore, the Court upheld
the statute as applied.49
The Court’s analysis in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club was similar.50 The Court upheld the application of a California
nondiscrimination statute to the Rotary Club, which refused membership to
women. Although it doubted that “admitting women . . . [would] affect in
any significant way” the expressive purposes of the Rotary Club, the Court
43 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny,
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 371–75, 391 (2006).
44 See, e.g., Stone, Content-Neutral, supra note 42, at 50, 50 n.13, 53 (characterizing
Brown as applying strict scrutiny).
45 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612–15 (1984).
46 Id. at 623.
47 Id. at 627.
48 Id. at 628.
49 Id. at 628–29.
50 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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concluded that any “infringement on [the] Rotary [Club’s] members’ right
of expressive association” was at any rate “justified because it serves the State’s
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.” 51
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court confronted a case in which the
application of a nondiscrimination statute did significantly affect an
organization’s expressive aims.52 At issue in Dale was the application of a New
Jersey public-accommodations law that prohibited discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation to the Boy Scouts, which had revoked a scoutmaster’s
membership after he came out as gay.53 The Court noted that “[t]he forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way
the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.” 54 It then
reasoned that having a gay man in a position of leadership would significantly
affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate its opposition to homosexuality. 55
Declining to follow Roberts by finding that the infringement on the Boy Scouts’
“freedom of expressive association” was justified by “compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,” the
Court held the statute unconstitutional as applied. 56
The rule that emerges from Roberts, Rotary International, and Dale is that
incidental burdens on speech that take the form of interference with
expressive associations’ leadership trigger strict scrutiny. 57 Hence, these cases

51 Id. at 548–49.
52 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
53 Id. at 645.
54 Id. at 648.
55 Id. at 653–56.
56 Id. at 648, 656–61 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
Confusingly, the Court in Dale referred to the burden imposed by the nondiscrimination
statute on First Amendment rights as “direct[]” rather than incidental. Id. at 659. Whatever
the Court meant by this statement, the burden on expression was straightforwardly
incidental in the sense that it resulted from the application of a law that was not designed
to regulate expression as such. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century:
Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 298 (2009) [hereinafter Stone,
Free Speech] (characterizing the burden in Dale as incidental).
57 In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 678–83 (2010), the Court
qualified the rule from Roberts and its progeny, holding that this rule does not apply in a
“limited public forum,” that is, public property that the government has opened for “use
by certain groups” or “discussion of certain subjects.” Id. at 679, 679 n.11. Like contentbased, direct restrictions on speech, the incidental burdens on speech at issue in Roberts
and its progeny ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny but, in the context of a limited public
forum, are consistent with the First Amendment if they are viewpoint neutral and
reasonable in light of the forum’s purposes. See id. at 679. Arguably, Martinez in
conjunction with the Principle of Consistency implies that the free-exercise regime that this
Essay proposes must be qualified to allow for deferential scrutiny of restrictions on religious
exercise in limited public or analogous fora, even if those restrictions fall within the
ministerial and/or conscience exceptions.
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mark a second exception to the general rule that incidental burdens on
speech trigger intermediate scrutiny.
2.

Working Backward to the Principle that Explains the Exceptions

Why does the Court reserve strict scrutiny for compelled disclosures of
membership in dissident expressive associations and interference with
expressive associations’ leadership if it subjects other incidental burdens on
speech to intermediate scrutiny? This Subsection lays the groundwork for an
answer. Subsubsection (a) argues that a central purpose of the Free Speech
Clause is to promote knowledge. Subsubsection (b) argues that compelled
disclosures of membership in dissident expressive associations constitute a
neutrally definable category of serious threats to knowledge.
Subsubsection (c) argues that government actions that interfere with
expressive associations’ leadership also constitute a neutrally definable
category of serious threats to knowledge. The hypothesis that emerges is that
the Court reserves strict scrutiny for neutrally definable categories of serious
threats to the central purposes of the Free Speech Clause.
a.

A Central Purpose of the Free Speech Clause is to Promote
Knowledge

The idea that a central purpose of the Free Speech Clause is to promote
knowledge follows from the dominant theory of the Free Speech Clause, the
“marketplace-of-ideas” theory. According to the marketplace-of-ideas theory,
over the long run the truth is most likely to emerge if the government permits
open debate in which citizens exchange ideas in a “free market.” 58 The Free
Speech Clause is designed to establish a free market in ideas, thereby
promoting long-run progress in knowledge.59
The marketplace-of-ideas theory finds support in Founding-era views of
the freedom of speech. In his celebrated concurrence in Whitney v. California,
Justice Brandeis declared that the Founders understood that the “freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth.”60 Justice Brandeis was right. The
Founders were familiar with the idea that freedom of speech facilitates the
discovery of truth. According to Enlightenment thinker Claude Adrien
Helvétius, “[i]t is . . . to the liberty of the press, that physics owes its
improvements.
Had this liberty never subsisted, how many errors,
consecrated by time, would be cited as incontestable axioms! What is here

58 See Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2
LEGAL THEORY 1, 1–8 (1996) (summarizing the marketplace-of-ideas theory).
59 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995); Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of
Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011).
60 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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said of physics is applicable to morality and politics.”61 The Founders agreed
and treated the discovery of truth as a justification for freedom of speech and
the press. According to Thomas Jefferson, the “most effectual” way to open
“avenues to truth” is by guaranteeing “the freedom of the press.” 62 This is
because “truth is great and will prevail, if left to herself”; “free argument and
debate” are “her natural weapons.”63
The marketplace-of-ideas theory finds additional support in Supreme
Court caselaw. On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has endorsed the
marketplace-of-ideas theory as presented in Brandeis’s concurrence in
Whitney and Justice Holmes’ earlier dissent in Abrams v. United States.64 In
United States v. Alvarez, for example, a plurality of the Court stated:
The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the
ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is
the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out
lie, the simple truth. . . . The theory of our Constitution is “that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market.”65

In another case, the Court quoted both Brandeis and Holmes, writing that
“[f]reedom of speech is ‘indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth,’ . . . and ‘the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.’”66 These cases confirm that the
Supreme Court recognizes the promotion of knowledge as a central purpose
of the Free Speech Clause.
b. Compelled Disclosures of Membership in Dissident Expressive
Associations Constitute a Neutrally Definable Category of Serious
Threats to Knowledge
Government actions that compel a dissident expressive association to
disclose its membership constitute a category of serious threats to knowledge.
Forcing dissident expressive associations to reveal their membership
threatens the progress of knowledge because it risks not just dampening but
altogether silencing certain viewpoints. The combination of having a small
membership to begin with and suffering a high rate of loss due to “fears of

61 2 CLAUDE ADRIEN HELVÉTIUS, A TREATISE ON
AND HIS EDUCATION 328 (W. Hooper trans., 1810).

MAN; HIS INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES

62 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge John Tyler (June 28, 1804), in JEFFERSON’S
LETTERS 222, 222 (Willson Whitman ed., 1940).
63 An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in VA. CODE ANN. § 571.
64 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012) (plurality) (quoting Abrams,
250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
66 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) (first
quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); and then
quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

148

[VOL. 96:3

reprisal”67 would mean that most dissident movements would be
“cripple[d]”68 and many would not “survive”69 at all. Were the viewpoints
espoused by dissident expressive associations merely dampened, then the
threat to the progress of knowledge would be significant but tolerable: in the
event that the dissident viewpoints were true, it might take longer for them to
prevail. But the threat is much more serious if the viewpoints are not just
dampened but silenced: it is difficult for the truth to prevail if it has not even
a small platform but no platform at all. As Professors Geoffrey R. Stone and
William P. Marshall put it, “in the disclosure context, there is a risk that
particular ideas or viewpoints may be driven completely from the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”70 Government actions that compel a dissident
expressive association to disclose its membership thus constitute a category of
serious threats to knowledge. And this category is neutrally definable: a court
need not take a position on the merits of an expressive association’s views to
assess whether the association is sufficiently ostracized to count as dissident. 71
c.

Government Actions that Interfere with Expressive Associations’
Leadership Constitute a Neutrally Definable Category of Serious
Threats to Knowledge

Government actions that interfere with expressive associations’
leadership constitute another category of serious threats to knowledge. Such
actions also risk driving certain views from the marketplace of ideas. The
leaders of an expressive association control its message. Thus, if the
government requires expressive associations to admit people of a certain type
into its leadership, then expressive associations will partially or completely
lose the ability to advocate viewpoints that people of that type
disproportionately—or uniformly, if the type is defined by viewpoint—
oppose. For example, suppose that a state passes a public accommodations
law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person’s status as a vegan,
a vegetarian, or neither. Application of this law to a nonprofit that operates
a vegan gift shop and promotes veganism as the only morally permissible
dietary regime might devastate its ability to advocate its viewpoint. It would
no longer be able to exclude from its leadership people who, say, are
vegetarians for health reasons and consider the nonprofit’s popular gift shop
to be the most effective vehicle for popularizing low-meat diets. Government
actions that interfere with expressive associations’ leadership thus constitute
a category of serious threats to knowledge. And this category is neutrally
67 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (per curiam).
68 Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982).
69 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71.
70 Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a
Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583, 610 (1983) (citing Brown, 459 U.S.
at 93).
71 See Brown, 459 U.S. at 88 (applying a neutral test for when a political party counts
as sufficiently dissident).
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definable: a court need not take a position on the merits of the views that an
expressive association advances to assess whether a given position in the
association’s organizational chart counts as a position of leadership or
influence.
3.

The Principle Behind the Exceptions

The considerations of Subsection 2 suggest an explanation for the two
exceptions identified in Subsection 1 to the general rule that incidental
burdens on speech trigger intermediate scrutiny. The principle behind these
exceptions appears to be that neutrally definable categories of serious threats
to the central purposes of the Free Speech Clause trigger strict scrutiny.
This Essay is not the first to advance such a hypothesis. Stone and
Marshall argue that the best explanation for Patterson, Bates, and Brown is the
Court’s “concern with the extraordinarily severe effects that . . . disclosure
requirements may have on” dissident expressive associations, namely, the
“risk that [their] ideas or viewpoints may be driven completely from the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”72 This Essay reaches a similar conclusion and extends
it to Roberts, Rotary International, and Dale.73
The hypothesis is attractive not only because it fits the data of the Court’s
decisions but also because it coheres with the Court’s overall approach to the
Free Speech Clause. The same principle that underlies the Court’s
application of strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on speech—a
commitment to the advance of knowledge through the marketplace of
ideas—also supports applying strict scrutiny to categories of incidental
burdens on speech that pose especially serious threats to knowledge by
impoverishing the marketplace of ideas.
B. Special Categories of Incidental Burdens on Religious Exercise
This Section unpacks the implications of Section A for the Court’s freeexercise jurisprudence.
Whereas Section A started with the Court’s
exceptions to the rule from O’Brien and worked backward to the principle that
explains them, this Section starts with that principle, transposed onto the Free
Exercise Clause, and works forward to the exceptions that it implies.
Subsection 1 begins with the principle that the Court should reserve strict
scrutiny for neutrally definable categories of serious threats to central
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause. Subsection 2 works forward from this
principle to the exceptions that it implies. Subsection 3 concludes by
identifying these exceptions as the ministerial exception and the conscience
exception.

72 Stone & Marshall, supra note 70, at 610–11 (citing Brown, 459 U.S. at 93).
73 Cf. Stone, Free Speech, supra note 56, at 298 (citing Dale as “illustrat[ive]” of the “few
instances” in which “the Court has held incidental effects [on speech] unconstitutional as
applied when the incidental effect of the law was seen by the Court as particularly severe”).
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The Principle Behind the Exceptions

Subsection A.3 concluded that the principle that explains the two
exceptions to the O’Brien rule is that incidental burdens on speech that fall
within neutrally definable categories of serious threats to the central purposes
of the Free Speech Clause trigger strict scrutiny. In conjunction with the
Principle of Consistency, this principle implies that incidental burdens on
religious exercise that fall within neutrally definable categories of serious
threats to the central purposes of the Free Exercise Clause should trigger strict
scrutiny, too.
2.

Working Forward to the Exceptions that the Principle Implies

This Subsection lays the groundwork for specifying the categories of
incidental burdens on religious exercise that the principle identified in
Subsection 1 implies should trigger strict scrutiny.
Subsubsection (a)
identifies promoting religious knowledge and its practice as a central purpose
of the Free Exercise Clause. Subsubsection (b) identifies protecting religious
integrity as another central purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.
Subsubsection (c) explains why government allocations of doctrinal authority
or spiritual responsibilities in religious institutions constitute a neutrally
definable category of serious threats to religious knowledge and its practice.
Subsubsection (d) explains why government pressures on individuals to
violate their religious conscience constitute a neutrally definable category of
serious threats to religious integrity.
a.

A Central Purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to Promote
Religious Knowledge and its Practice

Insofar as it protects freedom of opinion in matters of religion, the Free
Exercise Clause promotes a special case of the value that the Free Speech
Clause promotes, namely, knowledge about specifically religious matters (for
example, the existence or nonexistence of a God or gods). No doubt such
knowledge is valuable in itself. But it is also instrumental to another value.
To the extent that religion is concerned with, inter alia, ultimate questions
about how to live, religious knowledge is “practical.” Its practice or “exercise”
in a life well lived is itself valuable. This Subsubsection argues that the
proposition that a central purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to promote
not only religious knowledge but also its practice finds support in Foundingera views on the freedom of religion as well as Supreme Court caselaw.
Consider first Founding-era views about the freedom of religion. The
Founders and those who influenced them considered the promotion of
religious knowledge and its practice to be a central justification for religious
liberty. “Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error,”
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declared Thomas Jefferson.74 “Give a loose to them, they will support the true
religion by bringing every false one to their tribunal.” 75 And once religious
truth is known, it can be practiced, which is itself valuable. Thus, Timothy
Dwight concluded in 1794, “religious instruction . . . makes good men and
good men must be good citizens.” 76
These ideas found expression in the Virginia Statute for Establishing
Religious Freedom of 1786. The bill included a lengthy explanatory preface
that announced its guarantee of the freedom “to frequent or support any
religious worship, place or ministry” and “to profess, and by argument to
maintain, their opinions in matters of religion.” 77 According to the preface,
the guarantees of religious freedom were warranted in light of “the impious
presumption of legislators and rulers . . . [who,] setting up their own
opinions . . . [and] endeavoring to impose them on others, have established
and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world, and
through all time,” whereas “truth is great and will prevail, if left to herself.” 78
The preface also noted that the marketplace of religious ideas created by a
guarantee of religious liberty would promote sound religious practice. It
pointed out that the liberty of each to contribute “to the particular pastor[,]
whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most
persuasive to righteousness” will furnish “an additional incitement to earnest
and unremitting labors, for the instruction of mankind.”79
Perhaps no one articulated the power of religious liberty as a means to
religious knowledge and its practice more clearly than the representatives of
the Presbyterian Church in Virginia:
We are fully persuaded of the happy influence of Christianity upon the
morals of men; but we have never known it, in the history of its
progress, so effectual for this purpose, as when left to its native
excellence and evidence to recommend it, . . . free from the intrusive
hand of the civil magistrate.80

74 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA (1782), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 221 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., definitive ed. 1907).
75 Id.; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26,
1822), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 383, 385 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed.,
definitive ed. 1907) (arguing that “free inquiry and belief” will lead to the practice of the
true religion).
76 JAMES H. HUTSON, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 62
(1998).
77 An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in VA. CODE ANN. § 571.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia,
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS ON FREEDOM IN RELIGION 80, 81 (William Addison
Blakely ed., 3d rev. ed. 1943).

152

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

[VOL. 96:3

On this view, religious liberty promotes religious knowledge and its practice
in good “morals” by permitting the true religion’s “native excellence and
evidence to recommend it.”81
Next, consider Supreme Court caselaw. In Everson v. Board of Education,
the Court stated that “the provisions of the First Amendment . . . had the same
objective and were intended to provide the same protection against
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as” the Virginia Statute for
Establishing Religious Freedom.82 The Court reiterated this view in McGowan
v. Maryland.83 After quoting the Virginia statute at length, the Court declared:
“In this bill breathed the full amplitude of the spirit which inspired the First
Amendment, and this Court has looked to the bill, and to the Virginia history
which surrounded its enactment, as a gloss on the signification of the
Amendment.”84
The Court also acknowledged the importance of religious knowledge
and its practice in Wisconsin v. Yoder.85 Explaining its decision that the Free
Exercise Clause entitled the Amish to an exemption from compulsory
education laws, the Court wrote:
We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the
civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of
religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly influences
against great obstacles. There can be no assumption that today’s
majority is “right” and the Amish and others like them are “wrong.”86

The Court’s point was that the Free Exercise Clause bars the government from
acting on the tempting but dangerous assumption that minority ways of life
are nonsense. The purpose of doing so is to prevent the suppression of
minority ways of life that, like the monastic practices of those who “preserved”
the values of “the civilization of the Western World,” will eventually be proven
“right” in some important respect.87
b. A Central Purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to Protect
Religious Integrity
The Free Exercise Clause has another central purpose: to protect
religious integrity, that is, the practice of acting in accordance with one’s
sincere religious convictions. The proposition that protecting religious
integrity is a central purpose of the Free Exercise Clause also finds support in
Founding-era views on the freedom of religion as well as Supreme Court
caselaw.

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Id. at 493–94.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 223–24.
Id.
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Consider first Founding-era views of the freedom of religion. It is a staple
of ethics that a person is morally obligated to follow her conscience. Even if
her conscience is wrong, such that there is a sense in which she would be
acting immorally if she follows it, there is another sense in which she would
be acting immorally if she does not follow it.88 To pressure a person to act
against her conscience is therefore to pressure her to act morally
impermissibly. And to pressure someone to act morally impermissibly is itself
at least pro tanto morally impermissible. Thus, one has a right, even if only a
defeasible right, not to be pressured to act against one’s conscience, including
one’s conscience insofar as it is informed by one’s religion. 89 The Founders
understood this. Roger Williams memorably characterized forcing a person
to convert against her conscience as raping the person’s soul. 90 James
Madison wrote that “it is the right of every man to exercise [religion] as [his
conscience] may dictate,” because “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to
the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to
him.”91 Explaining why it granted an exemption from military conscription

88 See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, The “SUMMA THEOLOGICA” pt. I-II, q. 19, art. 5, at
240 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 2d ed. 1927) (“[W]hen the will is
at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil . . . .”). As
a normative matter, these considerations support protecting secular conscience no less than
religious conscience. Whether, as a legal matter, the Free Exercise Clause is best
interpreted as in fact protecting secular conscience is a question that this Essay does not
attempt to answer.
89 Some integrity-based arguments for religious liberty take a different form. This
Essay argues that pressuring a person to violate her religious conscience is at least pro tanto
morally impermissible because violating one’s religious conscience is morally
impermissible, and pressuring a person to do what is morally impermissible is itself at least
pro tanto morally impermissible. Others argue that harmony between one’s conduct and
one’s convictions is a basic good, and the state should promote rather than impede its
subjects’ enjoyment of basic goods. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif Girgis, Against the
New Puritanism: Empowering All, Encumbering None, in JOHN CORVINO, RYAN T. ANDERSON &
SHERIF GIRGIS, DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 108, 124–38 (2017);
Paul Bou-Habib, A Theory of Religious Accommodation, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 109, 117–21 (2006).
Although this Essay makes only the former argument, the two arguments are compatible,
and the latter also supports the idea that protecting religious integrity is a central purpose
of the Free Exercise Clause.
90 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE (n.p. 1664), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 1, 182
(Samuel L. Caldwell ed., Wipf & Stock Publishers 2007) (1963) (referring to “violat[ing]”
or “forc[ing]” a person’s “Conscience” as “Soule or Spirituall Rape”); see also MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS
EQUALITY 168–69 (2008) (endorsing Williams’ idea that “conscience,” understood as “the
faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate meaning of life[,] . . . is worthy of
respect whether the person is using it well or badly”).
91 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in 2
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1783–1787, at 183, 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901); cf
Declaration of Rights as Finally Adopted XVI (June 12, 1776), reprinted in KATE MASON
ROWLAND, 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE MASON, 1725–1792 438, 441
(Russell & Russell 1964) (1892) (“[A]ll men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”).
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to “people who from Religious Principles, cannot bear Arms in any case,” the
Continental Congress wrote that it “intend[s] no Violence to their
Consciencies.”92
It is unsurprising, then, that concern for religious integrity appears to
have provided at least part of the motivation for the Free Exercise Clause.
Daniel Carroll encouraged the adoption of what would become the Free
Exercise Clause on the ground that “the rights of conscience are, in their
nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of
governmental hand.”93 One of the earliest free-exercise cases was People v.
Phillips, in which a state court cited the Free Exercise Clause in refusing to
compel a Catholic priest to testify in violation of the seal of Confession.94 The
court observed that compelling the testimony would force the priest to act “in
violation of his conscience.”95 Whether the priest’s conscience was correct
did not matter. Indeed, the court noted that it “differ[ed] from the witness”
in “religious creed.”96 But it concluded that the guarantee of “free exercise
of . . . religion” in the “constitution of this country” prevents the government
from inflicting “torture to [persons’] consciences” regardless whether their
consciences are correct.97
Next, consider Supreme Court caselaw. The Supreme Court has
indicated that it too considers protecting religious integrity to be a central
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause. In one of its first free-exercise cases, it
stated that the Free Exercise Clause “was intended to allow every one under
the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his
relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his
judgment and conscience.”98 Similarly, in McGowan, the Court stated that,
“[i]n assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers of the First
Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions
and impositions of civil disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually
all of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience.”99 In
support of this proposition, the Court cited a proposed amendment to the
Constitution offered by the Virginia Convention, which affirmed a universal
right “to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience.”100

92 1 U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 33–34 (1950) (quoting
Resolution of the Continental Congress (July 18, 1775)).
93 MARY VIRGINIA GEIGER, DANIEL CARROLL: A FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION 164
(1943).
94 Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 200, 209 (1955)
(reporting the case). The case was decided in 1813 but not included in a reporter.
95 Id. at 200.
96 Id. at 209.
97 Id.
98 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
99 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464 (1961).
100 Id. at 464 n.2.
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Government Allocations of Doctrinal Authority or Spiritual
Responsibilities in Religious Institutions Constitute a Neutrally
Definable Category of Serious Threats to Religious Knowledge and
its Practice

Government allocations of doctrinal authority or spiritual
responsibilities in religious institutions constitute a neutrally definable
category of serious threats to the first of the Free Exercise Clause’s central
purposes: the promotion of religious knowledge and its practice.
Government control over who holds doctrinal authority in religious
institutions is a special case of, and thus poses the same type of threat to
knowledge as, government control over who occupies positions of leadership
of expressive associations generally. Government control over a religious
institution’s doctrinal authorities entails government control over a religious
institution’s doctrine. It is unlikely that government officials will exercise this
control in a way that facilitates the emergence of religious truth over the long
run.
A threat to the attainment of religious knowledge is also, of course, a
threat to the practice of religious knowledge. If one does not know what the
ideal way of life is, then it is difficult to achieve it. Therefore, government
control over who holds doctrinal authority in religious institutions is a threat
to the practice of religious knowledge as well as a threat to religious
knowledge itself.
Government allocation of spiritual responsibilities within a religious
institution is also a threat to the practice of religious knowledge. Many
religious institutions purport not just to impart knowledge about how to live
but also to provide the means—in many cases, the exclusive means—by which
to put this knowledge into practice. If the government allocates spiritual
responsibilities within a religious institution, then it risks doing so in a way
that compromises the institution’s ability to provide the means to put its
instruction into practice.
Finally, the category of government actions that allocate doctrinal
authority or spiritual responsibilities in a religious institution is neutrally
definable. To determine whether the government is allocating doctrinal
authority or spiritual responsibilities in a religious institution, a court does
need a basic understanding of how the religious institution is organized and
what spiritual roles it contains. But the court need not draw any conclusions
about whether the institution’s religious doctrines are true.
d. Government Pressures to Violate Religious Conscience Constitute a
Neutrally Definable Category of Serious Threats to Religious
Integrity
Government pressures to violate religious conscience constitute a
neutrally definable category of serious threats to the other central purpose of
the Free Exercise Clause: protecting religious integrity. Such pressures
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directly threaten religious integrity. And the category of such pressures is
neutrally definable. To determine whether the government is pressuring a
person to violate her religious conscience, a court need not evaluate the truth
of the person’s religious beliefs. The court simply needs to determine
whether the government is pressuring the person to do something that she
sincerely believes on religious grounds is morally impermissible. For it is the
obstacle to doing whatever a person sincerely believes her religion renders
morally obligatory, not the obstacle to doing what is in fact morally obligatory,
that is the serious threat to religious integrity. 101
It is worth noting that the category of government pressures to violate
religious conscience is narrower than it might seem, for two reasons. First, it
excludes government pressures to do otherwise than as one’s religious
convictions merely encourage. For example, an ordinance that prohibits
hunting would not contradict any moral demand of a religion that ascribes
spiritual benefits to, but does not require, hunting. Second, many religious
prescriptions are pro tanto rather than absolute and yield to countervailing
legal rules. For example, the command of Genesis 1:28 to “be fruitful and
multiply” could be understood to require married couples to have more than
one child when circumstances make it reasonably feasible to do so, with a
government one-child policy qualifying as a circumstance that makes it not
reasonably feasible. On this interpretation of Genesis 1:28, a government
one-child policy would not pressure anyone to violate its command.
3.

Exceptions to the Rule that Incidental Burdens on Religious Exercise
Should Trigger Intermediate Scrutiny

The considerations of Subsection 2 suggest that the principle identified
in Subsection 1—that neutrally identifiable, serious threats to the central
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause should trigger strict scrutiny—implies a
pair of exceptions to the general rule that incidental burdens on religious
exercise should trigger intermediate scrutiny. Notwithstanding this general
rule, incidental burdens that take the form of (1) government allocations of
doctrinal authority or spiritual responsibilities in religious institutions or
(2) government pressures to violate religious conscience should trigger strict
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision to reconsider Smith opens the door for the Court
to bring its First Amendment jurisprudence into alignment. The principle
that the First Amendment requires consistent treatment of incidental burdens
on speech and incidental burdens on religious exercise is intuitive and widely
accepted. Application of this principle in light of the Court’s free-speech
101 For a response to concerns about courts adjudicating religious sincerity, see Nathan
S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185 (2017).
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jurisprudence—including not only O’Brien but also Patterson, Roberts, and
their progeny—implies a regime in which incidental burdens on religious
exercise trigger intermediate scrutiny, unless they involve (1) government
allocations of doctrinal authority or spiritual responsibilities in religious
institutions or (2) government pressures to violate religious conscience, in
which case they trigger strict scrutiny. The Court has already moved partway
toward this regime by holding that the Free Exercise Clause, in conjunction
with the Establishment Clause, prohibits the government from interfering
with religious institutions’ selections of their own ministers. 102 When the
appropriate cases arise, the Court should consider completing the process of
aligning its First Amendment jurisprudence by prescribing strict scrutiny for
incidental burdens on religious exercise that fall within the conscience
exception and intermediate scrutiny for other incidental burdens on religious
exercise.

102 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
189–90 (2012). Note that this Essay’s suggestion that the Free Exercise Clause by itself
prohibits government interference with a religious institution’s ministerial appointments
unless such interference is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest is compatible with the claim that the Religion Clauses in conjunction
prohibit government interference with a religious institution’s ministerial appointments
altogether.

